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Abstract
Monitoring one’s current standing with respect to goals can promote effective self-regulation. However,
the present review suggests that there is an ostrich problem such that, in many instances, people have a
tendency to “bury their head in the sand” and intentionally avoid or reject information that would help
them to monitor their goal progress. For example, people with diabetes avoid monitoring their blood
glucose, and few people monitor their household energy consumption, check their bank balances, keep
track of what they are eating and so on. While situational constraints can explain some problems with
progress monitoring, we use a self-motives framework to posit that the decision to avoid monitoring
often represents the product of an interaction between different motives. For example, the desire to
accurately assess progress may conﬂict with the desire to protect or enhance the self. The present review
collates evidence pertaining to the ostrich problem, identiﬁes different motives that underlie the decision
to monitor versus not monitor goal progress, illustrates how the ostrich problemmight be integrated into
models of self-regulation, and provides suggestions for future research. In so doing, the review advances
our understanding of the nature and determinants of intentionally deﬁcient monitoring.
Imagine that, following a festive period of excess, someone has set the goal of losing weight
before the summer. How could this person ﬁnd out whether he/she was making progress
toward this goal? Assessing goal progress often requires an active decision (e.g., to keep a log
of exercise or calories consumed, to step on the scales) and an objective appraisal of the informa-
tion received. Given that the information gleaned from monitoring may not always be pleasant
(e.g., it might suggest that progress is slower than expected), we contend that people may choose
to ‘bury their heads in the sand’ and avoid such information. For example, Linde et al. (2005)
found that 20% of people enrolled in a weight loss program reported to have never self-weighed
prior to the program. In short, we suggest that there are instances in which people are motivated
to avoid or reject information about goal progress, a psychological phenomenon that we call the
ostrich problem.1 Our aim is to delineate the ostrich problem and discuss why it occurs and what
its consequences might be. We also illustrate how the ostrich problem might be integrated into
models of self-regulation and provide suggestions for future research on progress monitoring.
Monitoring goal progress involves periodically noting the qualities of goal-related behavior
or its outcomes and comparing these perceptions with salient reference values (Carver &
Scheier, 1990). Different types of information on goal progress may be more or less accessible,
and thus, the receipt of relevant information may be more or less intentional. For example, it is
difﬁcult not to notice signiﬁcant changes in one’s appearance that indicate whether one is
successful at losing weight. In other contexts, people may need to actively seek information
on their goal progress. Checking the balance of a savings account, for instance, requires visiting
the bank, reading one’s bank statement, or logging into an online system. We therefore distin-
guish between “active monitoring”, where the person actively and strategically seeks informa-
tion on goal progress and “passive monitoring” where information on goal progress becomes© 2013 The Authors. Social and Personality Psychology Compass published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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The Ostrich Problem 795apparent (at a conscious or an unconscious level) without any effort on the part of the receiver
(see Berger, 2002, for a similar distinction between strategic and non-strategic information
acquisition).2 People can derive information about their goal progress by monitoring behavior
or by monitoring the outcomes of behavior (Abraham & Michie, 2008).
Once a person has information pertaining to goal progress, he/she then needs to interpret that
information. Goals provide both a standard against which to compare one’s current state and
also a schema for making sense of the information available (Ashford & Cummings, 1983).
For example, the goal to reduce electricity consumption provides a context for interpreting
the information shown on an energy bill (e.g., in answering the question “am using more or less
electricity than before?”). The relation between the current rate of goal progress and the desired
rate is thought to be indicated by “a hazy and nonverbal sense of outcome expectancy” (Carver
& Scheier, 1990, p. 23) and affect (Carver, 2003; Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998).When progress
is better than expected (e.g., an energy bill suggests that efforts to save energy have led to
substantial savings), the person is predicted to experience positive affect (e.g., elation, eagerness).
However, when progress is poorer than desired (e.g., an energy bill suggests no change in
energy usage), then negative affect is predicted to ensue (e.g., sadness, disappointment).Evidence of the Ostrich Problem
Although there are times when people are motivated to monitor their goal progress, there are
also many instances in which people do not monitor their goal progress, even for goals that they
rate as important. To give some examples, self-monitoring of blood glucose for patients with
diabetes is relatively easy, quick, inexpensive, and associated with improved glycaemic control.
As such, there is evidence that people with diabetes aremotivated tomonitor their blood glucose
levels (Shankar et al., 2007). However, regular self-monitoring among people with diabetes is
uncommon (Evans et al., 1999; Harris et al., 1993; Peel et al., 2007). Studies also reveal a similar
avoidance of progress information in other contexts. Northcraft and Ashford (1990) showed that
people are less likely to seek feedback about the outcomes of their share portfolios if they have
low expectations about share performance. The National Savings and Investment Survey (2012)
revealed that, of the Britons who worry about their ﬁnances daily, only 10% monitor their
ﬁnances at least once a month. Similarly, despite rating relevant goals as important, few people
keep track of how much they have eaten (Polivy, 1976), how many alcoholic drinks they have
consumed (Hull, 1981), or the environmental impact of their behaviors (Shepherd & Kay,
2012). Finally, in organizational contexts, there is evidence that employees who lack self-
conﬁdence are less likely to seek feedback on their progress (Ashford, 1986) and that people
are unlikely to seek feedback when they believe that it will dampen their self-esteem, or are
worried about how seeking feedback might be construed by others (e.g., Tuckey et al., 2002).
The ostrich problem includes situations in which people receive relevant information but
intentionally fail to evaluate the implications of that information for their goal progress – in
other words, they (in a functional sense) reject the information. Reviews of information avoid-
ance (e.g., Sweeny et al., 2010) and studies of feedback interventions (for a review, see Kluger &
DeNisi, 1996) suggest that, even when information that could be used to evaluate goal progress
is available, people may ignore or selectively attend to aspects of that information. For example,
people sometimes reject information that: (i) is not consistent with their current attitudes
(Lundgren & Prislin, 1998), expectations (Pinkley et al., 1995), or self-beliefs (Holton &
Pyszczynski, 1989); (ii) may demand undesired action (Sweeny et al., 2010); (iii) suggests that
goal progress is poor rather than good (e.g., Jacobs et al., 1973; Johnson & Nawrocki, 1967);
or, relatedly, (iv) is expected to cause unpleasant emotions or diminish pleasant emotions
(Sweeny et al., 2010).© 2013 The Authors. Social and Personality Psychology
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monitoring goal progress is objectively difﬁcult (e.g., when information on goal progress does
not exist, when it is vague or confusing, or when the goal is vague). For example, Cowburn
and Stockley (2004) reviewed studies investigating consumer understanding of nutrition and
use of nutrition labeling and concluded that consumers found nutrition labels confusing.
These situations do not necessarily involve the active avoidance of information (and, thus,
are not considered to be examples of the ostrich problem) because the individual may
endeavor to monitor their current standing, but fail because the task is beyond their capacities.
Cases in which people monitor proxies or substitutes also do not reﬂect the ostrich problem (e.g.,
a student monitors how many pages she has read instead of assessing whether she understands
the material). The only exception would be if the substitution were motivated by the
desire to avoid obtaining an accurate assessment of progress on the relevant dimension.
In conclusion, the ostrich problem exists when pertinent information on goal progress is
available but avoided.Determinants of the Ostrich Problem
Given the potential beneﬁts of monitoring progress for promoting goal achievement and
behavior change, why might people actively avoid or ignore information pertaining to their
goal progress? Liberman and Dar (2009) provide a useful review of how aspects of the focal
goal (e.g., importance), along with personal (e.g., tolerance of uncertainty, need for closure)
and situational factors (e.g., accountability for performance), can inﬂuence the nature and
extent of progress monitoring. We acknowledge these determinants here but focus on the
different motives that underlie decisions to seek information on goal progress. In so doing,
we draw partly from reviews by Anseel et al. (2013), Anseel et al. (2007), Ashford et al.
(2003), Crommelinck and Anseel (2013), Sedikides and Strube (1997), Strube et al. (1986),
and Trope (1986), as well as empirical studies of when and why people seek feedback in
organizational or achievement contexts (e.g., Tuckey et al., 2002). Speciﬁcally, we use a
self-motives framework to suggest that the interaction among four different motives – self-
assessment, self-improvement, self-enhancement, and self-veriﬁcation – determines the nature
and extent of goal progress monitoring.
The self-assessment motive – that is, the desire to obtain accurate knowledge about current goal
progress – is perhaps the most obvious motive underlying the decision to seek information
about goal progress. People are motivated to ask questions such as “How am I doing?” both
to inform self-representations (e.g., the “monitored self”: Higgins, 1996) and goal pursuit. In
addition, the self-assessment motive can be triggered by the desire to better the self in some
way, which is known as the self-improvement motive. By way of illustration, someone who is keen
to reduce his/her environmental impact may decide to record the number of journeys that are
made by car and how much imported food is bought when grocery shopping. In short, we
suggest that the ostrich problem is less likely when self-assessment or self-improvement motives
are at the fore.
Self-assessment and improvement motives can, however, conﬂict with the self-enhancement
motive, which refers to the idea that people want to maintain a favorable view of themselves.3
When the self-enhancement motive is at the fore, peoplemay bury their heads in the sand when
they expect that goal progress could be poor because poor progress may reﬂect negatively on the
self and is, therefore, psychologically unpleasant. For example, Peel et al. (2007) quotes a person
with diabetes who has stopped self-monitoring blood glucose: the device is “telling me I’m
being bad maybe or not keeping—not being strict enough—and I think, “Oh oh, I ain’t using
you [the blood glucose meter] today” (p. 4). Similarly, Zuckerman et al. (1979) found that© 2013 The Authors. Social and Personality Psychology
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were less likely to select anagrams that were potentially diagnostic of their ability in a subsequent
task. This ﬁnding suggests that when participants expect that they have performed poorly, they
do not wish to have this information conﬁrmed (see also Carlson, 2013; Karlsson et al., 2009;
Moss et al., 2009; Moss et al., 2003; Northcraft & Ashford, 1990; Tuckey et al., 2002).
Avoiding monitoring may also allow people to escape from negative feelings associated with
holding or pursuing certain goals. For example, Candib (2008) suggested that “self-monitoring
of blood glucose throws it in your face … you must admit again and again that you have
diabetes” (p. 1263). Avoiding monitoring allows people to avoid these negative feelings. As
another example, surveys of travel habits suggest that, although people are concerned about
climate change, they view going on holiday as an escape from reality and everything that comes
with it – including thinking about climate change (Costley & Matthews, 2009).
Finally, people may avoid monitoring goal progress or reject progress information when
they believe that the information will be inconsistent with their view of themselves. This
desire to maintain a coherent self-representation is known as the self-veriﬁcation motive
(Swann, 1983) and has been shown to inﬂuence the nature and likelihood of progress
monitoring. Swann and Read (1981) found that participants spent less time reading social
feedback that was inconsistent with their self-conceptions than feedback that was
consistent. While the self-veriﬁcation motive is related to self-enhancement (Gregg
et al., 2011), the self-veriﬁcation motive is distinct because it does not necessarily entail
that people will avoid monitoring information that reﬂects poorly on the self (as predicted
by the self-enhancement motive). Rather, the self-veriﬁcation motive will lead people to
avoid information that is inconsistent with self-views, even if that information is positive
(see Rosen et al., 2013).
Conﬂict among the four self-motives can result in a dilemma over whether or not to monitor
goal progress. While the self-assessment motive might favor repeated monitoring, the self-
enhancement motive might discourage it if disappointing knowledge might be obtained. Thus,
in many instances, people may be torn between obtaining information that might be useful, but
psychologically unpleasant, and avoiding that information in order to feel better. So what
determines how this dilemma is resolved? Research on decision-making and choice implicates
self-control as an important factor determining the resolution of choice conﬂicts (e.g., Vohs
et al., 2008). Self-control is likely required to overcome proximal concerns (such as those related
to the implications of negative progress information) in order to advance more distal goals (e.g.,
self-improvement) (Fujita, 2011). Therefore, when the decision to monitor goal progress poses
a self-control dilemma and the person is not able or motivated to exert self-control, then we
contend that he or she is likely to exhibit the ostrich problem.
One important strategy or means by which motives such as self-enhancement can ﬁnd
expression is self-deception. Self-deception refers to instances in which people are
motivated to consciously disavow something that they know unconsciously (Greenwald,
1997). The classic example is the patient with cancer who knows that his/her condition
is terminal yet manages not to consciously acknowledge this fact. Our contention is that
similar processes can operate when people monitor goal progress, such that people may take
steps to prevent goal-relevant information (that they have some inkling of) from reaching
consciousness. One possible instance might be when passive forms of monitoring provide
clear information on progress (e.g., a bank card is refused at a store due to lack of funds),
but the person explicitly avoids more active forms of monitoring (e.g., going into the bank
to request a balance) so as not to conﬁrm an unfortunate state of ﬁnancial affairs. In this
respect, the ostrich problem includes instances when people deceive themselves with respect
to their goal progress.© 2013 The Authors. Social and Personality Psychology
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Given the importance of monitoring for selecting appropriate courses of action, it is likely that
avoiding or rejecting relevant information will undermine effective self-regulation and, thus,
goal attainment. For example, someone who holds the goal of saving energy, but does not
monitor his/her household electricity consumption, may be less likely to know which appli-
ances use the most electricity and so is less able to act in order to reduce his/her consumption
(Karjalainen, 2011). Similarly, a man who ignores problems in his relationship avoids accurately
appraising the situation and thus misses opportunities for remedial action when it is desirable for
the relationship. Stated in other terms, monitoring goal progress helps people to identify
discrepancies between their current and desired states that warrant action (Carver & Scheier,
1982; Fishbach et al., 2012; Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009). Therefore, avoiding monitoring makes
it difﬁcult to identify: (i) the need to act and (ii) the most appropriate way to do so. Liberman
and Dar (2009) also suggest that more relaxed monitoring may reduce one’s focus on the goal
and increase the likelihood of being sidetracked by irrelevant activities.
Empirical research is consistent with this analysis. For example, Polivy et al. (1986, Study 1)
found that female dieters ate fewer chocolates during a taste test when they were asked to leave
their wrappers on the table (and so, presumably, found it easy to monitor how many chocolates
they had eaten) than those who were asked to put their wrappers in a wastebasket. Evidence in
educational domains also suggests that interventions designed to promote self-monitoring have
positive effects. For instance, Broden et al. (1971) found that a schoolgirl who wanted to do
better at school studied more when she recorded whether or not she was studying (see also
Coughlin et al., 2012; Schmitz & Perels, 2011; Schunk, 1982). In a meta-analysis of exercise
promotion programs for adults with chronic illnesses, Conn et al. (2008) found that interven-
tions that prompted participants to monitor their physical activity levels led to better outcomes
than those that did not include a self-monitoring component. Similarly, Michie et al. (2009)
reported that when self-monitoring (e.g., by means of food diaries) was used in combination
with at least one other technique from control theory (i.e., prompting intention formation, spe-
ciﬁc goal setting, providing feedback on performance, or prompting review of behavioral goals),
the interventions had a medium-size effect on outcomes (d+=0.54). In summary, studies that
prompt monitoring of goal progress tend to ﬁnd that people whomonitor their current standing
are better able to achieve their goals than those who do not, at least on average.
Qualiﬁcations to the recommendation to always monitor goal progress can be found. Specif-
ically, selectively attending to some information and/or rejecting other information could
permit a biased view of goal progress that, in turn, can serve self-regulatory functions. For
example, Huang et al. (2012) found that people who are far away from achieving a goal exag-
gerate their progress, while people who are close to achieving a goal downplay their progress.
Huang et al. further found that these biased views of progress serve to maintain motivation that,
in turn, increases effort expended in pursuing the relevant goal (relative to those not possessing
such a biased view of goal progress). Similarly, Finkelstein and Fishbach (2012) demonstrated
that novices prefer to receive information indicating positive progress because it helps them
to stay motivated, presumably by reinforcing their commitment to the respective goal. There-
fore, people may avoid certain types of information in order to maintain a view of goal progress
that best serves self-regulation. The decision to avoid monitoring one goal may also serve other
goals. For example, a person striving for work-related goals may avoid monitoring the environ-
mental impact of his or her business trips. In these situations at least, avoiding monitoring
appears to be functional.
Given the preceding analysis, an important question concerns the conditions that dictate
whether monitoring progress is beneﬁcial or not. We believe that the answer to this question© 2013 The Authors. Social and Personality Psychology
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Theoretical models point to the self-regulatory beneﬁts of monitoring (e.g., identifying the
need to act, the most appropriate way to do so, and maintaining concentration on the focal
goal). Therefore, in themajority of instances, we contend that avoiding monitoring is a problem
for the self-regulating person. However, the recent research by Huang et al. (2012) and
Finkelstein and Fishbach (2012) suggests that there are also instances where an accurate appraisal
of goal progress is costly in the sense that it can undermine motivation. Active forms of progress
monitoring (e.g., keeping a diary of food consumption) may also consume regulatory resources
that may be needed for other tasks (Muraven et al., 1999). Finally, monitoring goal progress can
be costly in terms of implications for the self. In short, the extent to which progress monitoring
beneﬁts or hampers self-regulation likely depends on the extent to which the self-regulatory
beneﬁts of monitoring outweigh its costs.Integrating the Ostrich Problem into Models of Self-Regulation
Current theoretical frameworks highlight the importance of monitoring goal progress. One of
the most inﬂuential frameworks to date – Control Theory (Carver & Scheier, 1982) – suggests
that once goals have been formed, a cognitive ‘comparator’ monitors the relation between
the current rate of goal progress and the desired rate. This monitoring process serves to
identify the situation as one that requires self-control (Fishbach et al., 2012; Myrseth &
Fishbach, 2009). When a discrepancy is identiﬁed, the person makes efforts to reduce this
discrepancy (in particular, by performing goal-directed action or by revising the goal). In
turn, the outputs of doing so inﬂuence the correspondence between the current rate of goal
progress and the desired rate of goal progress (as measured by the monitoring system) and so
ensues a new loop of self-regulation by discrepancy reduction. According to Control Theory,
therefore, the idea of monitoring goal progress is central to effective self-regulation (see also
Ford, 1987; Louro et al., 2007; Miller et al., 1960; Powers, 1973; Powers et al., 1960a;
Powers et al., 1960b). However, revisions to theoretical models of self-regulation are
needed to (i) account for the difﬁculties that people experience monitoring goal progress
and (ii) identify the motives that inﬂuence the decision to monitor progress versus not.
Figure 1 depicts a revised framework for self-regulation, based on Control Theory (Carver
& Scheier, 1982, 1990), that takes into account the ostrich problem and explicitly identiﬁes
the motives that inﬂuence progress monitoring. There are two main contributions. First,
monitoring goal progress is viewed as a variable that can differ in both nature and extent.
At the simplest level, monitoring can be construed as a dichotomy – people can either
monitor their progress toward their goals (such that the comparator is activated) or avoid
monitoring goal progress, leading to the ostrich problem. Similarly, people can either accept
the information derived from monitoring or reject it, with the latter case leading to the ostrich
problem. However, monitoring can also vary in its extent and so is best viewed as a continuum
along which some point is optimal for the person, situation, and target goal. The second
contribution of the revised framework is to identify the motivational processes that inﬂuence
how the comparator functions. Speciﬁcally, we posit that the interaction between four different
self-motives – self-assessment, self-improvement, self-enhancement, and self-veriﬁcation
– inﬂuences whether people monitor their goal progress as well as how they interpret the
information derived from progress monitoring.
Current explanations of self-regulatory failure tend to focus on how properties of the goal
(e.g., viability, activation, elaboration: Sheeran et al., 2005) and the persons’ ability to act
when needed (e.g., self-regulatory strength: Baumeister et al., 2007; Hagger et al., 2010) in-
ﬂuence whether self-regulation is successful or not (for a review, see Baumeister et al., 1994).© 2013 The Authors. Social and Personality Psychology
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Figure 1. The ostrich problem within a model of self-regulation.
800 The Ostrich ProblemHowever, deﬁcient monitoring of goal progress has received less research attention. In addi-
tion, reviews of self-monitoring tend to focus on the effects of interventions (e.g., Bravata
et al., 2007; Dombrowski et al., 2012; Greaves et al., 2011; Michie et al., 2009) rather than
the extent to which people experience problems with monitoring, with attendant
implications of this for goal-striving success (however, see Liberman & Dar, 2009, for an
exception). We argue that problems with progress monitoring are an important explanation
for the difﬁculties that people experience when translating goals into action (for reviews,
see Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; Sheeran, 2002; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Our delineation
of the ostrich problem will hopefully provide a catalyst for future research into the frequency
and nature of goal progress monitoring in different domains.Issues and Questions for Future Research
Models like Control Theory (Carver & Scheier, 1982) predict that people will monitor their
rate of progress toward goals that are important and salient to them. In support of this idea,
Karoly and Ruehlman (1995) found that measures of value (e.g., “This goal is valuable to
me”) correlated with measures of self-monitoring (e.g., “I keep track of my overall progress to-
ward this goal”). However, there is currently little information on what types of information
people monitor when they hold a particular goal (e.g., to save energy at home, to be a good
person), how they go about doing so, and how the nature and frequency of monitoring is
shaped by individual differences and other factors. Thus, a primary aim for future research© 2013 The Authors. Social and Personality Psychology
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their progress with respect to their goals across a variety of domains. For example, how often do
people check their bank balances when they are trying to save money? How often do people
avoid looking at their utility bills?
Future research could also further examine the nature of the ostrich problem. For example, it
would be useful to ﬁnd out whether the ostrich problem is the result of a conscious, intentional
strategy (i.e., people decide whether or not to monitor their progress toward goals) and/or
unconscious, unintentional biases. Current conceptions are unclear on this point. Karlsson
et al. (2009) suggest that
people may delay acquiring information, even when doing so degrades the quality of decision-making,
if knowing the information forces them to confront and internalize possible disappointments they
would mentally prefer to avoid. (p. 97)
But it is unclear whether people are aware that they are doing this. Many of the ways in
which people defend themselves against threats (and here, one might view acknowledging
poor goal progress as a threat to self-integrity) are the result of unintentional biases (e.g.,
defensive inattention; Bohner & Wänke, 2002). It is therefore possible that people effectively
bury their heads in the sand, despite thinking that they do not. Future research should examine
the extent towhich people are aware of their ownmonitoring behavior and the extent towhich
deﬁcient monitoring is an intentional strategy.
Future research should also investigate the circumstances in which the ostrich problem is most
likely to occur. The self-motives framework outlined above suggests that the nature and extent
of progress monitoring are the result of an interaction between a set of sometimes discrepant
motives. Future research might measure (see Gregg et al., 2011) or manipulate (see Tuckey
et al., 2002, orWilson &Ross, 2000) the strength or salience of these motives and examine their
effects on subsequent progress monitoring. Given that the different motives underpinning
progress monitoring can present a conﬂict that requires self-control to resolve, future research
might also examine which variables inﬂuence how that conﬂict is resolved. The strength model
of self-control (Baumeister et al., 2007) suggests that self-control is a limited resource, with the
consequence that exerting self-control leads to a temporary depletion in subsequent self-control
performance, a phenomenon termed ego depletion (for reviews, see Baumeister et al., 2007;
Hagger et al., 2010). While there is debate over the mechanisms responsible for this effect
(e.g., Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012; Molden et al., 2012; Vohs et al., 2012), it is clear that
depleted people are less willing or able to deal with self-control dilemmas (Hagger et al.,
2010). Therefore, people whose self-control resources are depleted may be less likely to attend
to information that they expect will be psychologically uncomfortable. This might explain why
prompting participants to monitor their performance against a standard reduces the negative im-
pact of ego depletion on task performance (Wan & Sternthal, 2008), in that monitoring may not
be a default under such circumstances. It is also possible that some forms of monitoring, or mon-
itoring related to some goals, are less likely to be affected by prior exertions of self-control. 4 For
example, there is evidence that self-control that is supported by autonomous motivation (Moller
et al., 2006) or motivated by strong incentives (e.g., money: Muraven & Slessareva, 2003) is less
susceptible to the depleting effects of prior control attempts. Therefore, continued monitoring in
spite of regulatory depletion may be possible if the person is sufﬁciently motivated.
Finally, given the importance of monitoring in promoting effective goal striving and
instances in which people fail to monitor their actions, it is crucial to consider how the
ostrich problem can be overcome. How can people’s heads be pulled out of the sand in order
to promote effective self-regulation and sustainable behavior change? A large number of© 2013 The Authors. Social and Personality Psychology
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802 The Ostrich Probleminterventions have used different approaches to prompt progress monitoring (e.g., providing
participants with forms on which to record their diet and exercise: Madsen et al., 1993; home
energy monitors: Abrahamse et al., 2005; van Dam et al., 2010; or pedometers: Chan et al.,
2004). Ironically, however, it seems as though research on progress monitoring has worked
backwards. That is, we know more about how monitoring can be promoted than about the
problems in monitoring that such interventions address. Thus, we need more knowledge
concerning the psychological factors that impede monitoring in the ﬁrst place.
Indeed, research that can identify why people do not monitor and then target interventions
toward these determinants may hold the promise of longer-lasting behavior change. For exam-
ple, Crommelinck and Anseel (2013) proposed that people with low performance expectations
might be encouraged to seek feedback if it was emphasized to them that errors are a normal part
of the learning process. Trope and colleagues demonstrated that people are more willing to seek
negative feedback after a positivemoodmanipulation (Trope&Neter, 1994) and/or after having
succeeded on an unrelated task (Trope & Neter, 1994; Trope & Pomerantz, 1998), suggesting
that positive emotions reduce the weight of ego-defensive motives in feedback seeking. Finally,
techniques such as mindfulness and self-compassion may also help people to deal with the
negative implications of (anticipated) poor progress and thus prompt monitoring. Consistent
with this idea, Carlson (2013) suggests that mindfulness can overcome ego-protective motives
that affect how people process information about themselves (for other examples, see Neely
et al., 2009; Neff et al., 2005).
Conclusions
Both theoretical frameworks and empirical research suggest that monitoring goal progress can
facilitate effective goal striving. However, the present review posits that, in many instances, peo-
ple avoid or reject information that would help them to assess their goal progress. For example,
people with diabetes do not always monitor their blood glucose, and few people monitor their
household energy consumption, check their bank balances, and so on. While there may be
practical reasons why people do not monitor their progress, our thinking about the ostrich
problem suggests that there are also motivated reasons for avoiding information as well. To
some extent, avoidance of monitoring is part of popular culture (hence, the existence of idioms
like “bury your head in the sand” and “ignorance is bliss”), yet current scientiﬁc perspectives are
not explicit about the ostrich problem. The present review seeks to advance our understanding
of the nature of intentionally deﬁcient monitoring and open up future research into the pro-
cesses and determinants of monitoring, and not monitoring, goal progress.
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